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FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3817
INFO RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 0246

S E C R E T SEOUL 000504

SIPDIS

STATE PASS TO ISN/MTR

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/27/2019
TAGS: [PARM](#) [PREL](#) [MTCRE](#) [IR](#) [TU](#) [KS](#)
SUBJECT: (S) ROK CONCERNED BY TURKISH INTERMEDIARY EFFORTS
TO SUPPLY SOUTH KOREAN MACHINE TOOLS TO IRAN

REF: A. SECSTATE 28283
[1](#)B. SECSTATE 27957

Classified By: POLMC Joseph Yun for reasons 1.4 (b,c,d).

[1](#)1. (U) This is an action request. See para 3.

[1](#)2. (S) Poloff on March 26 delivered reftel A demarche to Kim Jae-woo of the Disarmament and Nonproliferation Division. Kim said the following.

-- The ROKG was unaware of the information (in reftel A), but would refer the case to the appropriate agencies since Iran's Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG) is involved.

-- Since the items were not controlled by any of the multilateral export control regimes, Kim was unsure if Ak Makina would have needed to submit an end-use certificate. In the event that Ak Makina did submit an end-use certificate issued by the Government of Turkey (GOT), then by international agreement, the ROKG would have to accept the certificate as legitimate.

-- After being told that the GOT in the past had denied Ak Makina some export licenses on other unrelated cases for proliferation activities with Iran (reftel B), Kim replied that the case then was much more serious and that as part of its investigation, the ROKG also would examine the end-use certificates that Ak Makina may have submitted for unrelated transactions.

-- When the investigation is completed, the ROKG would inform the USG of the results.

[1](#)3. (S) The ROKG requests that the USG share any additional information it may have on Ak Makina and Ardalan Machineries Company.
STEPHENS